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In Kinik v. International Trade Commission, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit suggested in dicta that the 
defenses available to foreign manufacturers in infringement 
actions under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) in Federal district courts do 
not apply to exclusion actions before the International Trade 
Commission.  This iBrief argues that this decision is problematic 
for three reasons: (1) the Federal Circuit’s decision is 
inconsistent with the ITC’s longstanding tradition of consulting 
the patent statute when adjudicating exclusion actions under 19 
U.S.C. § 1337, (2) the court’s suggestion that the ITC should be 
given broad discretion to resolve conflicts between the patent 
statute and the Tariff Act is at odds with the Chevron doctrine, 
and (3) if the ITC  employs the broad discretion that Kinik 
confers to it by excluding more foreign art than Federal district 
courts could lawfully exclude under the patent statute, the 
enforcement of domestic patent policy in the United States could 
conceivably violate obligations of non-discrimination (Article 
27.1) and burden-shifting (Article 34) imposed by the TRIPS 
Agreement.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 United States patent holders seeking to prevent foreign 
manufacturers from infringing their process patents have traditionally 
enjoyed two forms of legal redress.  Under existing patent law a patent 
holder can sue in Federal district court to prevent the importation of 
goods produced by patented processes, provided that such goods are not 
“materially changed by subsequent processes” or have not become “a 
trivial and nonessential component of another product.”2  If these two 
                                                     
1 LLM/J.D. 2006, Duke University School of Law; M.A. 2000, Stanford 
University; B.A. 1997, Loyola University Chicago.  This article has benefitted 
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2 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000). 
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tests are met, patent holders can obtain monetary damages which reflect 
the economic losses that they have sustained.  Alternatively, under the 
amended Tariff Act of 1930 a patent holder can initiate an exclusion 
action before the International Trade Commission (“ITC”), which if 
successful, results in a ban on imported products produced through 
infringing processes.3     
¶2 The effectiveness of these two complementary forms of 
enforcement depends upon ensuring that the same infringement standards 
apply in both federal court actions and exclusion actions before the ITC.  
The 1988 Process Patents Amendment Act (“Act”) provides that shared-
standard:  If a foreign product producer sells or uses within the territories 
of the United States a product made by a process patented therein, as 
long as the sale or use is commercial, that foreign producer is guilty of 
wrongful infringement.  Unfortunately, this shared standard is threatened 
by Kinik v. ITC,4 a recent case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit suggested in dicta that § 271(g) defenses only apply in 
federal court.  Thus, in exclusion actions, the ITC may be emboldened in 
the future to use its own unrestrained discretion to determine whether a 
foreign product should be excluded.   
¶3 This has serious implications for international patent regulation.  
While federal courts have an obligation to strike a balance between the 
interests of U.S. patent holders against the need to allow foreign 
manufacturers to innovate, the ITC can capriciously disturb this careful 
balance by excluding the importation of foreign products that do not run 
afoul of current patent law.  To make matters worse, the Kinik dicta also 
undermine the preclusive effect that federal court rulings are traditionally 
given in subsequent ITC proceedings.    
I. BREAKING WITH TRADITION 
¶4 The facts of Kinik are relatively simple.  The Minnesota Mining 
and Manufacturing Co. and Ultimate Abrasive Systems LLC (hereinafter 
“3M”) brought an exclusion action before the ITC to prevent the Kinik 
Company from importing abrasive products from Taiwan.  3M’s theory 
was that the abrasive products Kinik was importing were being 
manufactured with the aid of one of its patented processes, namely U.S. 
Patent No. 5,620,489 (“‘489 patent”).5  In the exclusion proceeding, the 
ITC agreed with 3M, finding that that process claimed in the ‘489 patent 
was being used in Taiwan to manufacture abrasive products later 
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4 362 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).   
5 Id. at 1361. 
2006 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 9 
imported by the Kinik Company into the United States.6  The Federal 
Circuit, however, held that the ‘489 patent was not actually infringed by 
the manufacturing processes utilized in Taiwan.7  The Federal Circuit 
thus reversed the ITC’s judgment of infringement.8 
¶5 The holding in Kinik is not really surprising.  But the same 
cannot be said of its dicta, which possess startling implications for 
process patent protection in the United States.  When this case was 
before the ITC, in addition to arguing that the imported goods at issue 
were not manufactured with the unauthorized assistance of a patented 
process, the Kinik Company also offered a clever fall-back position.  
According to this argument, its products did not infringe the ‘489 patent 
because under § 271(g) they had been materially changed by subsequent 
processes.9   
¶6 The ITC was unsympathetic to this contention, and held that the 
defenses to infringement provided under § 271(g) are not available in 
exclusion actions before the ITC.  Citing ambiguous language from the 
legislative history of the Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 10  
(“Act”), the ITC concluded that the defenses provided in § 271(g) are 
inapplicable to cases brought before the ITC because Congress intended 
to prevent courts from extending these defenses to exclusion actions.  
The relevant language relied upon by the ITC states that “the 
amendments made by this subtitle shall not deprive a patent owner of any 
remedies available . . . under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, or 
under any other provision of law.”11  Noting that such a clause would not 
have been included “unless it served to avert conflict between the Patent 
Act and the Tariff Act,” 12  and after considering other sources of 
legislative history, the Federal Circuit concluded that if § 271(g) 
defenses were available in exclusion actions, patent holders would be 
depredated of remedies guaranteed explicitly by the Process Patent 
                                                     
6 Certain Abrasive Products made Using a Process for Making Power Preforms, 
and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-449, Initial Determination 
(Feb. 8, 2002); Final Determination (Mar. 29, 2002).    
7 362 F.3d at 1364-66 (finding that the Commission’s claim construction was 
erroneous because the patentee (1) made it very clear that the invention was 
limited to perform mixtures containing a larger volume of liquid binder than 
matrix material and (2) included language in the patent specifications 
disclaiming mixtures that do not contain a ratio of liquid binder to powder 
higher than 1:1). 
8 Id. at 1361 (“We conclude that on the correct claim construction the process of 
the ‘489 patent was not practiced; the judgment of infringement is reversed.”).   
9 Id. 
10 Pub. L. 100-418, § 9006(c). 
11 Id.   
12 362 F.3d at 1362. 
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Amendments Act.  Thus, the ITC and the Federal Circuit regrettably 
endorsed a theory of § 271(g) applicability that encourages a bifurcated 
approach to patent enforcement policy.   
¶7 There are a number of reasons to think that this bifurcated policy 
is inconsistent with a commitment to reading congressional history 
sensibly.  To see why Kinik’s dicta represent an affront to interpretive 
fidelity,13 consider the following.  According to the Federal Circuit, the 
key question in evaluating the Kinik Company’s claim that it could avail 
itself of § 271(g) defenses is whether Congress clearly intended for these 
defenses to apply in exclusion actions before the ITC.  The Senate 
Report for the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (later 
labeled the Process Patent Amendments Act) indicates that § 271(g) was 
intended to provide “patent owners the new right to sue for damages and 
seek an injunction in Federal district court when someone, without 
authorization, uses or sells in the United States, or imports into the 
United States a product made by their patented process.”14  The language 
in the Senate Report explicitly indicates where § 271(g) is intended to 
apply, but does not include any language suggesting that this provision is 
not meant to apply to actions before the ITC.   
¶8 Unfortunately, the Senate Report does suggest that in adding § 
271(g) to the Patent Act, Congress had “no intention to impose any of 
these limitations on owners of products or on owners of process patents 
in suits they are able to bring under existing law.  Neither is there any 
intention for these provisions to limit in any way the ability of process 
patent owners to obtain relief from the U.S. International Trade 
Commission.”15  Before addressing the meaning that the Federal Circuit 
gave to this dense passage in the Senate Report, it is useful to pause for a 
moment to consider what is meant by the phrase “these limitations” in 
the above excerpt.  “These limitations” refers to the defenses in § 271(g), 
because from the perspective of a U.S. patent holder, these defenses 
make it less likely that a process patent will be enforced.  After all, under 
§ 271(g) a holder of a process patent will not prevail if a defendant 
successfully shows that the imported product at issue is either produced 
by a process that is “materially changed by subsequent processes” or has 
become a “trivial and nonessential component of another product.” 16   
This appears to be a rudimentary observation; but it is important to keep 
                                                     
13 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 
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sense of the broad values that informed the creation of the necessarily-limited 
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14 S. Rep. No. 100-83 at 27 (1987). 
15 Id. at 60-61 (emphasis added). 
16 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000). 
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in mind that these defenses impose substantial practical limitations on 
process patent holders’ rights.    
¶9 The Federal Circuit interpreted Senate Report in the following 
fashion.  On the theory that Congress never meant § 271(g) to restrict, 
hamper or restrain patent owners in actions before the ITC, which the 
Kinik court took to follow necessarily from the Senate Report’s gloss on 
§ 9006(c) that is emphasized above, the Federal Circuit read into the 
Process Patent Amendments Act a critical limitation on § 271(g)’s 
applicability. 
¶10 This decision to read into the Act a limitation of § 271(g)’s 
defenses in particular is very hard to justify for five reasons.  First, as a 
matter of statutory interpretation the Senate Report simply does not 
compel or unequivocally support this reading.  The key language cited in 
Kinik merely says that Congress has no intention of limiting or 
constraining patent holders’ ability to “obtain relief from the U.S. 
International Trade Commission.”17   The most natural reading of the 
Senate Report is that Congress wanted to make it clear that existing 
remedies, especially the ability to obtain exclusion orders from the ITC, 
were not somehow undermined by the new set of defenses being made 
available to defendants by § 271(g).  Remedies, after all, refer to the type 
of relief that a patent holder can secure—not to the legal standards that 
govern the appropriateness of granting those remedies in a particular 
case.  Thus, § 9006(c)’s clear commitment to preserving the remedies 
available in ITC proceedings is in no way inconsistent with applying the 
substantive legal standards embodied in § 271(g) to exclusion actions 
brought before the ITC.  The Kinik court, in effect, made a category 
mistake—confusing types of relief with substantive legal standards—in 
suggesting that § 271(g) defenses do not apply to exclusion actions.18 
                                                     
17 S. Rep. No. 100–83 at 60–61. 
18 It is important to recognize that the Senate Report resists this interpretation.  
To reiterate, the key language in the report indicates that in enacting § 271(g), 
Congress did not intend to “limit in any way the ability of process patent owners 
to obtain relief from the U.S. International Trade Commission.”  Because the 
operative verb is “to limit,” one must assume that Congress intended the 
defenses in § 271(g) not to apply to exclusion actions before the ITC since 
allowing these defenses to apply would constitute a clear limitation (of a very 
particular kind) on the ability of process patent holders to obtain relief from the 
ITC.   
  The most promising riposte to this complaint is that if Congress really had 
intended to prevent § 271(g) from applying to exclusion actions, it would have 
included in the official text of the Process Patents Amendment Act language 
explicitly forbidding the ITC from applying § 271(g) defenses to exclusion 
actions.  Congress would have done this for one simple reason:  to ensure that § 
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¶11 Second, a strong argument can be made that Kinik unnecessarily 
relied upon the legislative history of the Process Patent Amendments 
Act.  The proper use of legislative history is not achieved simply by 
trying to give effect to every statement or claim made in the legislative 
record. 19   To be sure, legislative history can be helpful in clarifying 
difficult questions of congressional intent when a statute’s meaning is 
deeply ambiguous.  But in this case, there really was no need to rely on 
the Senate Report because § 9006(c) was not—for reasons we have 
already explored—deeply ambiguous.  Moreover, sensible jurists 
understand the pitfalls of relying heavily upon statements in the 
legislative record to determine controversial issues of law.  Given the 
administrative demands placed on members of the House and the Senate, 
the reliance of those members on information received from numerous 
staff members, and the sheer difficulty of arriving at reasonable 
compromises on matters of public policy,20 it is hardly surprising that 
statements made in the legislative history might not provide the best lens 
through which to view enacted statutes in particular cases.21  Yet the 
                                                                                                                       
271(g), the only provision in the Patent Act that does not (under the theory 
advocated by the Kinik court) apply in actions before the ITC, was not 
mistakenly applied in exclusion actions by the ITC.  Yet the Act itself merely 
states that these “amendments . . . shall not deprive a patent holder of any 
remedies available . . . under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.”  Pub. L. 
100–418, § 9006(c).          
19 Blackstone’s admonition to avoid reading a statute literally if doing so will 
produce an absurd result seems apt in the context of applying principles drawn 
from legislative history to difficult questions of statutory interpretation:  “Where 
some collateral matter arises out of the general words [of a statute], and happens 
to be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this 
consequence is not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty 
to expound the statute by equity.”  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 90–91 (15th ed. 1809). 
20 Justice Stephen Breyer, while sitting as Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, wrote a very interesting law review article in which 
he argued that although legislative history can be a legitimate source of insight 
into the purpose, scope, and applicability of a statute or a statutory provision, the 
complexity of the lawmaking process itself should temper the weight a judge or 
a court should give to statements in the legislative record.  In addition, then-
Judge Breyer argued that floor statements and other elements in the legislative 
record are favored means of expressing congressional intent by members of the 
House and the Senate because they assume that “[t]his language is more general 
in form, and would not bind courts in cases where it would make no sense to do 
so.”  Stephen Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture: On the Uses of 
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 860 (1992).    
21 As Breyer aptly notes, “[n]o one claims that history is always useful; only that 
it sometimes helps.”  Id. at 862. 
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Kinik court was blissfully unaware of this basic drawback of excessive 
reliance on legislative history. 
¶12 Third, with one exception, the Federal Circuit has never held that 
a provision in the Patent Act does not apply to ITC proceedings.  In 
Nutrinova v. ITC,22 the court added a footnote suggesting that 35 U.S.C. 
§ 295, a provision dealing with burden shifting that was adopted as part 
of the same statute in which § 271(g) was included, might not apply to 
ITC proceedings since it states on its face that it applies to courts.  The 
key difference between § 295 and § 271(g) is that the former is 
procedural in nature while the latter is substantive.  In other words, the 
Federal Circuit has never held that a substantive provision in the Patent 
Statute does not apply to proceedings before the Commission.                            
¶13 Fourth, after the Process Patent Amendments Act was passed in 
1988, the ITC consistently and openly recognized the general 
applicability of § 271(g) defenses in exclusion actions.  For example, in 
1994 in In The Matter of Certain Recombinantly Produced Human 
Growth Hormones, the ITC endorsed the administrative law judge’s 
decision to apply § 271(g) defenses to an exclusion action. 23   By 
consistently endorsing the application of these defenses, the accepted 
practice of the ITC prior to Kinik paved the way for a stable, unified 
approach to enforcing process patents abroad.  This was, of course, the 
main purpose behind adding § 271(g) to the Patent Statute in the first 
place.24   
¶14 One might object that the accepted practice of the ITC prior to 
Kinik is not particularly telling, since the only relevant issue is whether 
the Commission’s rejection of § 271(g) defenses is legally legitimate.  
The best legal response to this objection is that “[i]n deciding whether an 
intellectual property right is infringed, the Commission applies the same 
law and standards used in the district courts.”25  This can only mean that 
all equitable and legal defenses are available to defendants in exclusion 
                                                     
22 224 F.3d 1356, 1360 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000).    
23 Initial Determination, Inv. No. 337-TA-358, 1994 WL 930040 at p. 75-77, 
Nov. 29, 1994.   
24 As Timothy Holbrook has astutely observed, § 271(g) “closes a loophole in 
the statute resulting from the territorial nature of the patent rights.” Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale:” Assessing Patent Infringement 
for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability 
Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 762 
(2003).  
25 William L. Lafuze & Patricia F. Stanford, An Overview of Section 337 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930: A Primer for Practice Before the International Trade 
Commission, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459, 481 (1992). 
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actions before the ITC.26  As the Federal Circuit put this point in Texas 
Instruments v. Tessera, “[i]n section 337 proceedings relevant to patent 
infringement, the ITC follows Title 35 of the United States Code and the 
case law of this court.”27 
¶15 In addition, Federal Circuit decisions have historically had—and 
for a host of reasons should continue to have—claim and issue preclusive 
effect on subsequent ITC proceedings. 28   Why is claim preclusion 
relevant to the question of whether there should be a uniform approach to 
process patent enforcement?  As a pragmatic matter parties litigating 
before the Federal Circuit cannot rest assured that their finality 
interests—that is, the set of interests claim and issue preclusion are 
designed to secure—are protected if a more plaintiff-friendly 
enforcement standard is available in exclusion actions before the ITC.29  
As the Supreme Court has said, “[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an 
end of litigation [and] that those who have contested an issue shall be 
bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be 
considered forever settled as between the parties.”30  Furthermore, as a 
matter of theoretical jurisprudence the Federal Circuit’s commitment to 
claim and issue preclusion fits better conceptually with a commitment to 
a uniform process patent enforcement regime than such a commitment 
fits with a bifurcated regime in which the ITC is free to exclude a range 
of art that Federal Courts consider non-infringing.  Although it may be 
reasonable to offer process patent holders two distinct avenues of 
redress—one in federal court and another before the International Trade 
                                                     
26 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2000). 
27 231 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).   
28 See Young Engineers, Inc. v. USITC, 721 F.2d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(“If a patent owner has unsuccessfully attacked an alleged infringer for the same 
infringing acts in a prior court proceeding, no substantive argument has been 
advanced as to why the patent owner should be given an opportunity to put forth 
the same charge of infringement again. The alleged infringer is as burdened by 
the litigation before the Commission as before a court. Moreover, if a second 
court proceeding would be precluded, there seems no reason that the 
Commission must devote time and attention to that matter.”). 
29 There are two critical differences between litigating in federal court and 
litigating before the ITC that heighten (rather than diminish) the importance of 
finality for defendants in process patent cases.  First, the evidentiary procedures 
adopted by the ITC are more lax than those allowed in federal court; and second, 
there are statutory restrictions on the amount of time that the ITC may devote to 
a particular investigation.  See 19 USC § 1337(b)(1) (requiring the ITC to make 
a determination “at the earliest practicable time”). 
30 Baldwin v. Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931).   
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Commission—the adoption of significantly different legal standards in 
these fora is not defensible.31 
¶16 Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, in light of the fact that the 
Process Patent Amendments Act expanded the rights of patent owners, 
conditioning the exercise of these new rights simply cannot “deprive a 
patent owner of any remedies available” under pre-Act law.32  The Act 
affords a patent holder a right to prevent a foreign manufacturer from 
using a “patented process outside the United States to make products and 
then import and sell the products in the United States without incurring 
infringement liability.”33  As a technical legal matter, this right is limited 
by § 271(g)’s defenses in the following way:  (1) the new right a patent 
holder enjoys under the Act to prevent foreign manufacturers from 
unauthorized use of process patents abroad must be exercised with § 
271(g)’s limitations, and (2) any limitations built into this right do not 
abridge or dilute this right.34  Call this the “new right” argument.   
¶17 This “new right” argument makes it clear that if Congress crafts 
a right with certain boundaries, certain conditions on the exercise of that 
right, it is nonsensical to complain that the right conferred “deprives” 
patent holders of remedies available under preexisting (but different) 
law.  To be sure, it is possible, strictly speaking, that Congress intended 
to create a right that could be exercised in any venue but also intended 
the limitations on that right to be venue-specific.  In light of the 
ambiguity in the Senate Report, the importance of promoting a uniform 
policy for process patent enforcement, and the force of the “new right” 
                                                     
31 One could reasonably argue that this observation cuts in the other direction as 
well.  The idea is that fostering a truly unified, stable system of process patent 
enforcement abroad also requires giving ITC findings and decisions claim and 
issue preclusive effect in federal courts.  This proposal has some surface 
plausibility, although it does certainly ignore the fact that Markman hearings are 
not widely utilized in exclusion actions before the ITC.  In addition, by virtue of 
having in rem jurisdiction over all imported products, some ITC exclusion 
orders would be moot in federal court (in light of the fact that patent plaintiffs in 
federal court have to establish personal jurisdiction over defendants).  In an 
interesting student note, Douglas Martin argues that if issue preclusive effect is 
given only to the ITC’s factual findings, then the Federal Circuit’s de novo 
review privileges for matters of law will increase the degree of uniformity in 
patent law enforcement.  Douglas P. Martin, Comment, Preclusive Effect of 
Factual Determinations of the International Trade Commission With Regard to 
Patent Matters, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 885, 914–15 (1995). 
32 Pub. L. 100–418, § 9006(c).   
33 Anna M. Budde, Note, Liability of a Foreign Manufacturer Using a Patented 
Process for Indirect Infringement, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 291, 294 (1995). 
34 I am indebted to Professor Mark Lemley for suggesting this argument. 
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argument in evaluating § 9006(c) of the Act, it is clear that § 271(g) was 
not meant as a venue-specific provision.      
II. EXCESSIVE DISCRETION 
¶18 In describing the Kinik court’s reasoning with respect to why the 
ITC’s rejection of § 271 was acceptable, we left out an important detail 
concerning the nature of the deference accorded to the ITC’s prior 
handling of the Kinik Company’s claims.  By way of review, in the 
original action before the ITC, the Kinik Company claimed that § 
271(g)’s defenses applied.  The ITC rejected this argument, and the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC after consulting two statutes and one 
document from the Act’s legislative history: 
• Section 9006(c) of the Act:  These “amendments . . . 
shall not deprive a patent holder of any remedies 
available . . . under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 
1930”35; 
• The language in § 271(g):  “A product which is 
made by a patented process will, for the purposes of 
this title, not be considered to so made after—(1) it 
is materially changed by subsequent processes; or 
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component 
of another product”36; and 
• The Senate Report’s language:  There is no 
“intention for these provisions to limit in any way 
the ability of process patent owners to obtain relief 
from the U.S. International Trade Commission.”37  
According to Kinik, under the Chevron doctrine38 “[t]o the extent that 
there is any uncertainty or ambiguity in the interpretation of § 337(a) and 
its successor § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii), deference must be given to the view of 
the agency that is charged with its administration.”39  The Federal Circuit 
emphasized the possibility that the relevant statutes were riddled with 
“uncertainty” or “ambiguity” in large part because the Chevron doctrine 
imposes a duty upon courts to defer to “reasonable agency interpretations 
not only when Congress expressly delegates interpretative authority to an 
                                                     
35 Id.   
36 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).   
37 S. Rep. No. 100-83 at 27 (1987). 
38 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).    
39 362 F.3d at 1363. 
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agency, but also when Congress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a statute 
that an agency is charged with administering.”40
¶19 Although some argue that the Chevron doctrine can undermine 
courts’ ability to exercise a reasonable amount of discretion in deciding 
when to defer to agency decisions,41 the principal problem with Kinik’s 
invocation of the Chevron doctrine is not jurisprudential in nature.  The 
main problem is that the ITC is not the agency charged with interpreting 
the Patent Act.  Thus, on a defensible interpretation of the Chevron 
doctrine, the particular interpretive choices the ITC made in this instance 
do not deserve any deference.42    
¶20 Even if one were to argue that the Commission is eligible for 
Chevron’s protection because it was “forced” to make a decision about a 
legal issue at the intersection of § 1337 (a statute that it is charged with 
administering) and § 271(g), Chevron clearly does not apply.  Because 
the Commission read a substantive limitation into a statute it was not 
charged with administering, the Chevron doctrine is inapplicable.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s most recent interpretation of the scope of 
the Chevron doctrine supports this argument unequivocally:  The 
Chevron doctrine is predicated upon the “presumption that Congress, 
when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an 
agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and 
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) 
to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”43   
                                                     
40 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 
833, 833 (2001).    
41 See id. (“Chevron’s equation of gaps and ambiguities with express delegations 
turned the doctrine of mandatory deference, formerly an isolated pocket of 
administrative law doctrine, into a ubiquitous formula governing court-agency 
relations.  With this one small doctrinal shift, the Court effected a fundamental 
transformation in the relationship between courts and agencies under 
administrative law.”) (emphasis added).   
42 The fact that the ITC is not charged with interpreting the Patent Act has an 
additional implication.  In paragraphs thirteen and fourteen, a number of ITC 
cases were cited as support for the claim that prior to Kinik, the ITC openly 
recognized the general applicability of § 271(g) defenses in exclusion actions.  It 
is important to realize that the fact the ITC’s pre-Kinik record of adjudication 
reflected a better understanding of § 271(g)’s applicability does not in any way 
imply that the ITC deserves deference under the Chevron doctrine.  Thus, 
claiming that prior to Kinik the ITC employed a superior understanding of § 
271(g)’s defenses does not intimate that there is a principled reason under 
Chevron to grant deference to the ITC’s practices.  Put another way, recognizing 
the legal coherence of pre-Kinik decisions is not to be confused with claiming 
that the ITC generally deserves deference under the Chevron doctrine. 
43 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996).   
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¶21 Not only does the Court make clear that Chevron deference 
requires that the agency requesting deference be the same agency 
charged with administering a given statute, the Court also makes plain 
that where ambiguity is “built in” to a statute, the agency that administers 
that statute has a responsibility not to abuse the degree of discretion the 
ambiguity allows.  In other words, even if one conceded arguendo that 
Chevron applies to the question in Kinik, a very compelling argument 
could be made that the ITC abused its discretion by reading a substantive 
limitation into a statutory provision that the Commission was clearly not 
charged with administering.  In that connection, one could also argue that 
the Federal Circuit, in virtue of being charged with hearing appeals from 
all actions arising under Title 35 and from all ITC actions in § 1337 
matters, is in the best position to decide what types of limitations § 
271(g) should have.  The Federal Circuit should decide this issue de 
novo and not abdicate its responsibility on this important issue.      
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF KINIK FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
¶22 The main theme that runs through Parts I and II of this iBrief is 
that the Kinik dicta threaten to create two different regimes for process 
patent protection—one that strikes a reasonable balance between the 
interests of patent holders and follow-on innovators and another that may 
be unjustifiably pro-plaintiff.  The first regime is governed by § 271(g); 
the second, as we have just seen, is governed by the unfettered discretion 
of the ITC.   
¶23 What is wrong with having two very different regimes?  One 
could argue that Kinik chafes against the interests of U.S. consumers, 
consumers who would benefit from having access to less expensive 
goods, including everything from medicines to automobile parts.  
Framed in the idiom of antitrust law, Kinik provides U.S. patents holders 
an additional method of preventing competition from foreign 
manufacturers.  There is, fortunately, an exception in § 1337(d)(1) that 
allows the ITC to refuse to issue an exclusion order on public health and 
welfare grounds.  Even so, a more effective means of reducing the 
likelihood that ITC exclusion actions will lend the color of law to 
otherwise unlawful, anticompetitive purposes would be to recognize the 
applicability of § 271(g) to exclusion actions.     
¶24 Kinik also has implications for international relations.  Since 
Kinik stands for the idea that the ITC can lawfully make it significantly 
harder for a defendant to establish a defense based on noninfringement in 
an exclusion dispute, the foreign business community is likely to view 
this as an instance of protectionism.  After all, the ITC is a body that can 
unilaterally exclude foreign products from importation into the United 
States, a fact that will inevitably color foreign perception of the fairness 
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of its procedures.  More specifically, foreign business interests are likely 
to find unfair (and perhaps hypocritical) Kinik’s refusal to extend § 
271(g)’s defenses—defenses that all defendants have in U.S. federal 
courts—to exclusion actions given the aggregate effect of exclusion 
orders on the balance of trade in intellectual property.  Foreign 
businesses are likely to find this policy unfair (and perhaps hypocritical) 
precisely because the United States has used the TRIPS Agreement44 to 
aggressively prosecute violations of its intellectual property rights all 
over the world. 45   One commentator even calls the U.S. “the most 
strident enforcer of TRIPS.”46   Thus, from the perspective of foreign 
business this development in patent policy casts the U.S. in a bad light, 
essentially as a country readily willing to embrace a predatory and self-
serving attitude toward international trade where international 
cooperation in this area would be better served by an attitude of fairness 
and a genuine commitment to providing reciprocal treatment. 
¶25 There is another way, a slightly more formalistic way, of 
thinking about why Kinik’s dicta promote protectionism.  Under Article 
27 of TRIPS, “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable 
without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.”47  If 
the ITC were to exclude products made abroad that federal courts would 
not find infringing (for they would apply § 271(g)), then a discrimination 
claim with respect to the place of invention would actually be hard to 
make under TRIPS.  After all, unless the defendant raises validity 
counterclaims, then the “place of invention” is by definition the 
jurisdiction in which the United States patent holder invented the process 
patent at issue.  Yet it would be possible to raise a discrimination claim 
                                                     
44 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
45 The United States files “more TRIPS complaints than all other WTO countries 
combined.”  Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: 
The United States, Trade, and the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 160, 173 (2005).   
46 Id. 
47 TRIPS, supra note 44, at art. 27.1.  A note of clarification is necessary.  The 
principal aim of Article 27 is to ensure that favorable discrimination is not 
granted to local pantentees over foreign patent holders.  In other words, this 
article was designed to ensure that foreign patent holders received the same 
degree of protection as local patent holders.  But Article 27 also prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of whether “products are imported or produced 
locally.”  Kevin J. Nowak, Note, Staying Within the Negotiated Framework: 
Abiding by the Non-Discrimination Clause in Trips Article 27, 26 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 899, 911 (2005).      
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with respect to whether products are imported or locally produced, for 
the simple reason that the ITC provides a special remedy for domestic 
patent holders who believe that their process patents have been used 
without authorization by foreign manufacturers.48 
¶26 It is uncertain that such a claim would be successful before the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”), but the thrust of the claim is that a 
domestic patent policy that prevents access to a domestic market 
constitutes discrimination “as to the availability and enjoyability of 
patents due to the place of invention.”49   Given that one of TRIPS’s 
primary objectives is to eliminate national working requirements that 
would otherwise compel a patentee to manufacture a patented product or 
apply a patented process within the patent granting country, this claim 
might appear dubious.50  Article 27 certainly does not explicitly mention 
the rights of accused infringers.  Yet the underling legal theory is a 
familiar one under TRIPS:  alleged foreign infringers are treated unfairly 
under Article 27 if they are treated differently than similarly situated 
domestic infringers.  The WTO Appellate Body would be hard pressed to 
conclude that the form of “discrimination” is in principle verboten by 
Article 27, for this would completely invalidate the Process Patent 
Amendments Act.  Nevertheless, the Appellate Body could conclude that 
where (1) a certain set of limitations (§ 271(g) defenses) to a domestic 
patent right are not applied in a venue that regulates what can be 
imported into the United States, (2) causing the deliberate exclusion of 
foreign products that would not be considered infringing art in U.S. 
federal courts, Article 27 is violated.   
                                                     
48 In fact, when the Process Patent Amendments Act was being considered in the 
Senate, Commissioner Quigg expressly endorsed maintaining the availability of 
exclusion actions because he felt that they provided a very different kind of 
protection for domestic patent holders than did ordinary litigation in federal 
courts.  He stated:  “I think it is important to keep 337, because it [exclusion 
actions provide] a short-term compact operation which the patent owner can 
use to prevent the market from slipping away to foreign manufacturers.  Patent 
litigation in the Federal courts is a more prolonged thing.  It is not likely that 
you would be able to get a preliminary injunction during the litigation, and 
therefore the 337 approach does have a benefit for U.S. patent holders” 
(emphasis added).  Process Patents, Hearings on S. 1543 before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess., p. 12.  
49 Nowak, supra note 47, at 919.   
50 See generally Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working 
Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at International Law, 35 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 243 (1997). 
2006 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 9 
¶27 In addition, Kinik also appears to be inconsistent with the 
language and purpose of Article 34 of TRIPS.51  Article 34.1, in relevant 
part, states that “[f]or the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the 
infringement of the rights of the [patent holder] . . . the judicial 
authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that 
the process to obtain an identical produce is different from the patented 
process.”52  To ensure that judicial authorities have this power, TRIPS 
requires that in circumstances where the “patented process is new” or 
whenever there is a “substantial likelihood that the identical product was 
made by [patented] process” at issue, “Members shall provide . . . that 
any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent 
owner shall, in absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been 
[produced] by the patented process.”53   
¶28 This sounds very complicated, but the main thrust of Article 34.1 
is straightforward.  The idea is that because disputes over patented 
processes are likely to involve difficult evidentiary issues, each signatory 
of the TRIPS Agreement should take steps to ensure that a patent holder 
is not short-changed because she is unable to (strictly) prove that the 
process used for manufacturing purposes on foreign soil is identical to 
the process she patented.  The most obvious strategy for doing so is to 
place the burden on the defendant.  But since the drafters of Article 34.1 
could not have intended this burden-shifting provision to be interpreted 
as an irrefutable presumption, they included a critical caveat:  it is only 
“in the absence of proof to the contrary” that a presumption of process 
patent infringement can hold up. 
¶29 Therein lies the rub with Kinik:  If Article 34.1 of TRIPS 
requires signatories to allow defendants to rebut any presumption of 
process patent infringement, then the United States has a commitment to 
allow defendants before federal courts and the ITC to provide evidence 
that controverts the presumption of infringement.  Notice, however, that 
it is not clear that defendants must be able to offer every conceivable 
type of evidence to challenge a plaintiff’s assertions of infringement.  
Thus, Kinik appears to be inconsistent with Article 34.1 only if that 
provision’s requirement is interpreted so broadly that defendants must be 
able to present any and all conceivable defenses.  Suffice it to say that 
this seems a bit of a stretch, since Article 34.1 is clearly concerned with 
establishing procedural standards for handling factual defenses in process 
patent infringement cases.  That the drafters of the Agreement were 
obviously far less concerned with equitable defenses than they were with 
factual defenses is obvious from the language in 34.1(b):  “if there is a 
                                                     
51 TRIPS, supra note 44, at art. 34.1.   
52 Id. 
53 Id. (emphasis added).   
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substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process 
and the owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to 
determine the process actually used,” then “Members shall provide that 
any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent 
owner shall, in absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been 
[produced] by the patented process.”54        
¶30 Speculating on how often claims based on Article 27.1 or 34.1 
would be successful is beyond the scope of this iBrief.  However, it is 
clear that the selective application of defenses like those embodied in § 
271(g) to process patent infringement raises serious concerns for nations 
that are committed to complying with the letter and the spirit of TRIPS.  
Certainly, given the economic returns that TRIPS provides the United 
States, it would be wise for Congress to take steps to nullify the Federal 
Circuit’s unfortunate misstep in Kinik.     
CONCLUSION 
¶31 The dicta in Kinik are dangerous because they suggest that the 
policies underlying the enforcement of domestic patent law against 
foreign infringers can be cast aside at the whim of the Federal Circuit.  
This is extremely problematic.  The purpose of the Process Patents 
Amendment Act of 1988 is to balance two competing policy objectives.  
On the one hand, the Act was meant to provide a form of legal redress 
for domestic patent holders whose process patents were being infringed 
on foreign soil (in addition to the exclusion actions already available 
under existing trade law).  But the Act surely should be read as having 
the purpose of preventing domestic patent holders from misusing their 
patents by illegitimately obtaining exclusion orders from the 
International Trade Commission, even if one thinks that the “for the 
purposes of this title” language in § 271(g) renders the scope of this 
provision’s applicability unclear.  Under § 271(g) of the Act, an 
exclusion order is illegitimate if the product produced by the patented 
process has been significantly changed by subsequent processes or if the 
product has become a trivial and nonessential component of another 
product.   
¶32 Unfortunately, Kinik has given future courts an incentive to 
ignore the clear policy objectives of the Process Patents Amendment Act 
of 1988.  These policy objectives are crucial to striking a fair balance 
between effective process patent protection, on the one hand, and 
recognizing the right of foreign industry to aggressively innovate, on the 
other.  Not only did Kinik provide no persuasive policy justifications for 
setting § 271(g) aside, the most compelling policy justifications for 
                                                     
54 Id. 
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leaving this crucial provision intact appear to have been deliberately 
ignored.  We can only hope that Congress will soon step in55 to ensure 
that the fragmented enforcement regime Kinik endorses is dismantled 
sooner rather than later. 
 
                                                     
55 The Patent Law Committee is considering supporting a bill that would strike 
the language “for the purposes of this title” from 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) in the hopes 
that doing so would make it obvious to the International Trade Commission that 
§ 271(g)’s defenses do indeed apply to exclusion actions.  This modification of § 
271(g) would certainly render moot the (already-implausible) Chevron argument 
that the ITC relied upon, since there would be no need for the ITC to interpret 
the scope of this provision in the Patent Statute.  However, the ITC did not 
exclusively rely upon the aforementioned language in § 271(g); it also relied 
upon § 9006(c) and opaque language in the Senate Report.   
  What this suggests is that if § 271(g) is amended as outlined above, the Federal 
Circuit could (1) review the ITC’s interpretation of the statute and the legislative 
history de novo and (2) conclude, contrary to Congress’ intent in these 
circumstances, that § 271(g) applies in a case-by-case basis.  The reason this 
admittedly unlikely scenario is still worth taking seriously is that the Federal 
Circuit found plausible the Commission’s reliance on § 9006(c) and the Senate 
Report, which strongly suggests that when it affirmed the Commission’s 
determination, the Federal Circuit had more in mind than the six words that the 
Patent Law Committee wants to strike from the current version of § 271(g).  See 
Amendment to 271(g), http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/patent_legislation/ 
(Oct. 14, 2005) (“Now, there is a movement afoot to change this aspect of the 
law, striking words that limit those defense to actions under the Patent Act so 
that they could be applied with equal force at the ITC.”).   
